India's Indo-Pacific Strategy 2026: SAGAR, IMEC, and the New Maritime Map

The map India put back at the centre

For four decades after 1945, the standard geographic framing of strategic Asia was "Asia-Pacific". The term came from the United States and its Pacific alliances: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia. It made sense when the central security problem was the Pacific theatre — Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Soviet Pacific fleet.

In the 2010s, the framing shifted. "Indo-Pacific" entered the official vocabulary of Japan (2007, PM Abe's Two Oceans speech), the United States (2017, Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy), and India (PM Modi's Shangri-La Dialogue speech, June 2018).

The shift wasn't just terminological. It put the Indian Ocean — and India — back at the centre of strategic geography. Everything that has followed in Indian foreign policy in the last decade flows from that map.

SAGAR — the foundational doctrine

SAGAR ("Security and Growth for All in the Region") was announced by PM Modi during his March 2015 visit to Mauritius. The acronym is also the Hindi word for "ocean". The doctrine has five tenets:

1. Safeguard India's mainland and island territories and maritime interests
2. Ensure safe, secure, and stable seas for regional friends
3. Promote economic and cooperative development in the region
4. Tackle transnational maritime threats — piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, trafficking — through collective action
5. Sustainable use of ocean resources

In practice, SAGAR operationalised through:

• Indian Navy deployments — White Shipping Information Exchange agreements with 22 countries, where India shares maritime traffic data and gets reciprocal access
• Capacity-building — Indian Coast Guard and Navy provide training to Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Mozambique, Madagascar, Comoros
• Anti-piracy patrols — Indian Navy has been continuously deployed in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, with cumulative escort of 4,500+ merchant ships
• HADR (Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief) — India was first responder to Sri Lanka's 2022 economic crisis, Maldives water crisis 2014, cyclones in Madagascar and Mozambique

The strategic intent: position India as the net security provider for the Indian Ocean. The doctrine is open enough to absorb future operational requirements without rewriting policy.

IMEC — the connectivity corridor

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor was announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023. The route:

• India → UAE (by sea, primarily through Mumbai and Mundra ports)
• UAE → Saudi Arabia → Jordan → Israel (by rail)
• Israel → Europe (by sea, Haifa to Greek and Italian ports)

Members: India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, US, France, Germany, Italy, the EU. Israel is the rail terminus but not formally a signatory.

The strategic case:

• Counter-BRI: an alternative to China's Belt and Road for connecting Asia to Europe
• Faster than the Suez route by approximately 40% (rail + multi-modal)
• Energy and digital connectivity: planned hydrogen pipelines and fibre optic cables alongside the rail route
• Diplomatic re-anchoring: gives the US-aligned Gulf states a Westbound framework that doesn't depend on China

The risks:

• Post-October 2023 Israel-Hamas war disrupted the Israel rail terminus
• Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping raise the war-risk premium on the whole corridor
• Implementation timeline — physically building rail across the Levant is a 10-15 year project at best

As of 2026, IMEC is more political framework than operational reality. The signing happened; the construction is at preliminary stages. The corridor's strategic value will mature over the next decade.

The Andaman & Nicobar Command — India's western gate

The Andaman and Nicobar archipelago — 572 islands stretching nearly 750 km in the eastern Bay of Bengal — is India's most strategically located territory. It sits at the western entrance to the Strait of Malacca, the chokepoint through which roughly 80% of China's energy imports and 50% of global trade passes.

The Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC), established in 2001, is India's only fully tri-service joint operational command. It commands:

• INS Baaz (naval air station, Car Nicobar)
• INS Utkrosh (naval air station, Port Blair)
• INS Kohassa (naval air station, Diglipur)
• Air bases (IAF) at Port Blair, Car Nicobar, Campbell Bay
• Indian Army formations
• Coast Guard assets

The strategic premise: from Andaman & Nicobar, India can monitor — and if required, interdict — the Malacca chokepoint. The presence is the deterrent. China has historically prioritised the "Malacca Dilemma" in its strategic planning, partly because of ANC's geography.

Significant investment since 2020 has expanded runway lengths, added forward-deployed surveillance, and improved combat-aircraft basing.

Maritime partnerships — the Indian Ocean ring

India's Indian Ocean partnerships are bilateral, layered, and pragmatic.

Partner	Cooperation pattern
Mauritius	Indian-built coast guard ships, satellite ground station, post-2014 Indian PM visit annual
Seychelles	Long-running coastal radar surveillance grid, training
Sri Lanka	Trincomalee port redevelopment with Indian Oil; coast guard cooperation
Maldives	Long history of cooperation, currently rebuilding post-Muizzu period
Mozambique	Anti-piracy training, Indian Navy ship-visits routine
Madagascar	Coast guard cooperation, recent HADR delivery
Comoros	Capacity-building bilateral
Tanzania	New cooperation framework 2024

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), launched by India in 2008, brings together navies of 35 Indian Ocean states for cooperation on maritime security, HADR, and capability development.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which India chaired in 2011-2013 and again in 2025, is the broader economic and security platform with 23 member states.

See the neighbourhood-first policy piece for the sub-regional bilateral dynamics, particularly Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh.

What India doesn't do (and why)

Three deliberate restraints in India's Indo-Pacific strategy:

1. No South China Sea FONOPs

The US Navy regularly conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) inside the 12-nautical-mile zones claimed by China around disputed South China Sea features. India does not. The Indian Navy transits the South China Sea, conducts port calls (Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore), and participates in joint exercises — but it does not challenge China's sovereignty claims through FONOPs.

The reasoning: a FONOP in the South China Sea would invite reciprocal Chinese pressure in the Indian Ocean, where India has the home advantage. The asymmetry favours restraint.

2. No troops in the South China Sea region

India has no military bases east of the Malacca Strait. The closest forward deployment is in Andaman & Nicobar (still in the Indian Ocean). India's naval reach extends to the western Pacific via Quad exercises and port calls, but no permanent presence.

3. No formal anti-China alignment

The Quad (see the Quad explainer) is explicitly framed as "for a free and open Indo-Pacific" rather than "against China". The framing is sustained partly because India insists on it.

How this connects to BRICS, the LAC, and the Russia question

India's Indo-Pacific strategy is one quadrant of a four-quadrant foreign policy:

Quadrant	Forum	Purpose
Indo-Pacific maritime	Quad, IORA, BIMSTEC, IMEC	Strategic balancing + connectivity
Continental	LAC management, neighbourhood-first	Border security + sub-regional influence
Global South	BRICS, G20, Voice of Global South	Development finance + multipolarity
Bilateral majors	US, Russia, Israel, France, UAE	Defence tech + energy + diaspora

For the LAC dimension, see China–India LAC tensions. For BRICS, see BRICS expansion 2026. For the Russia continued partnership, see Russia–Ukraine and India's stake.

Bottom line

India's Indo-Pacific strategy is the most consequential geographic and strategic reframing in Indian foreign policy since 1991. It places India at the centre of a maritime-strategic theatre that stretches from Mozambique to the South China Sea. It is doctrinally grounded (SAGAR), operationally backed (the Indian Navy and ANC), institutionally networked (Quad, IORA, BIMSTEC), and infrastructure-anchored (IMEC).

What it gives India: net security provider status in the Indian Ocean, strategic relevance in the Western Pacific without overextension, and a durable framework for the next several decades of Asian competition.

What it costs India: constant diplomatic management, especially of the Russia and Iran relationships that don't fit the Indo-Pacific frame naturally, and the deepening strategic competition with China that the framing implicitly encodes.

For the broader cluster, see our pieces on the Quad explained, BRICS expansion 2026, China–India LAC tensions, and India's neighbourhood-first policy.